Jordanian authorities are alleged to have used Cellebrite phone-cracking technology to access the devices of domestic activists and human rights defenders. The findings come from an investigation by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, which suggests nonconsensual data extraction from activist phones between late 2023 and mid-2025.
Citizen Lab, working with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), analyzed four phones that had been seized and returned by Jordanian authorities. The research group concluded with high confidence that Cellebrite’s forensic extraction products were used. This alleged use of Cellebrite technology raises concerns about its implications for digital privacy and human rights in Jordan.
Cellebrite Technology and Activist Devices
The investigation focused on the phones of four individuals: a political activist, a student organizer, an activist/researcher, and a human rights defender. Three of these individuals used iPhones, while the fourth used an Android device. Court documents related to criminal proceedings under Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law provided additional supporting evidence for the analysis.
These cases align with a period of protests in Jordan supporting Palestinians, suggesting a potential link between political expression and state surveillance. Citizen Lab’s findings contribute to a growing body of reports detailing the alleged misuse of Cellebrite tools by various governments.
Previous Allegations of Misuse
Last year, Amnesty International reported that Serbian authorities had used Cellebrite technology, in conjunction with spyware, to monitor activists and journalists. Such incidents highlight a broader pattern of concern regarding how digital forensic tools are employed against civil society organizations globally.
Citizen Lab’s research indicates that Cellebrite products are extensively used against civil society in Jordan, with forensic evidence pointing to their deployment as early as 2020. This suggests a sustained application of the technology for data extraction.
Concerns Over Surveillance Methods
Kamel Al-Shawareb, the lead author of the report and a pseudonymous research fellow at Citizen Lab, explained that surveillance encompasses more than just spyware. He noted that authoritarian states can access smartphone data remotely via sophisticated spyware or by physically seizing devices and utilizing tools like Cellebrite to extract their contents.
The activists whose phones were examined expressed feelings of violation and a resulting impact on their willingness to express themselves freely. One individual, speaking anonymously to OCCRP, described the experience as feeling “wronged and violated” due to a perceived imbalance of power making them “legally weak.”
Cellebrite’s Response and Policies
A spokesperson for Cellebrite, Victor Cooper, stated that the company cannot disclose specific details about its customers. However, he emphasized that Cellebrite prohibits transactions with entities on U.S. and international sanctions lists.
Cooper further explained that Cellebrite vets potential customers against internal human rights parameters, leading them to discontinue business with clients in jurisdictions where risks are deemed incompatible with their corporate values. He asserted that the company licenses its technology solely for lawful purposes and requires customers to certify they have valid legal authority before use.
He clarified that Cellebrite technology is distinct from spyware; it cannot intercept live communications or provide real-time monitoring. Instead, it accesses private data through legal processes to assist in investigations after an event has occurred.
Cooper added that Cellebrite takes all allegations of potential misuse seriously and reviews such claims based on their ethics and integrity policies. He stated that when appropriate, the company takes steps to investigate and may cease product use by specific customers.
Citizen Lab, however, described Cellebrite’s responses to their inquiries during the investigation as “vague and unsubstantiated.”
Next Steps and Uncertainties
Jordan’s Ministry of Government Affairs and its embassy in the United States did not respond to requests for comment regarding the Citizen Lab investigation. The next steps are likely to involve further scrutiny of Cellebrite’s client vetting processes and potential calls for more robust oversight of digital forensic technology used by state actors. The extent to which Cellebrite will investigate and potentially act on these allegations remains a key area to watch.